Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment by Jackson, Elizabeth
 1 
 Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment 
ELIZABETH JACKSON 
Australian National University / Ryerson University  
lizjackson111@gmail.com 
 
Penultimate draft; forthcoming in Mind 
Please cite published version  
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1. Introduction 
 
The ability to keep a commitment over a long period of time is a crucial aspect of our lives.  
Completing grad school, picking up a new instrument, getting in shape, marriage, and religious 
commitment all require it. But keeping these sorts of commitments isn’t without obstacles. Sometimes, 
we get counterevidence that makes us question whether we ought to have made the commitment in 
the first place: is this workout program really the best means of getting healthy? Does God really exist? 
Other times, we lose the desires that underlie our original commitment: is getting fit really worth 
running outside in the cold every day? Is God someone I should want to commit my life to, regardless 
of whether theism is true?  
 In this paper, I argue that the relationship between three attitudes, namely, belief, faith, and 
hope, shows how we can overcome epistemic and conative obstacles that we encounter in our 
commitments. Specifically, my thesis is that paradigm cases of belief, faith, and hope all play the same 
role in rationalizing long-term, action-oriented commitments. The relation between these three 
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attitudes can explain how a commitment to act can be rational, in the face of both counterevidence 
and waning affections.1 
 This paper is structured as follows. In §2, I discuss acceptance (i.e. acting as if some 
proposition is true). To illuminate what makes acceptance rational, I describe two models of rational 
action. I show how on both models, there are two components of rational action: an epistemic 
component and a conative component. Then, in §3, I argue that paradigm cases of belief, faith, and 
hope that p all rationalize accepting that p. I conclude in §4 with two upshots. The first is about the 
diachronic rationality of commitment, and the second about the special role that faith plays in 
justifying long-term commitments.  
 A few caveats before I begin. First, my focus is on propositional versions of belief, faith, and 
hope, rather than e.g. belief in a concept or faith in a person. Second, this paper will provide a general, 
descriptive characterization of how these propositional attitudes function, with an eye toward showing 
how these states can rationalize action. In the same way that decision theory takes credences and 
utilities as inputs to determine rational action, but is not meant as a tool for evaluating the rationality 
of e.g. a credal state, I will show how certain propositional attitudes, i.e. belief, faith, and hope, make 
actions rational for that agent. The purpose of this paper is not to give a story about rational belief, 
faith or hope, but instead to give a general description of these states and explore their relationship to 
rational action.  Finally, the main goal of this paper is not to provide a novel theory of the nature of 
belief, or faith, or hope. Instead, this paper explains existing theories of each attitude, borrowing from 
current accounts to draw connections between them. Its contribution involves the way that belief, 
faith, and hope come together to rationalize our long-term commitments via acceptance. This, in turn, 
                                                        
1 See Morton and Paul (2019) for a complimentary paper on the rationality of long-term commitment, in which they 
discuss ‘grit,’ the capacity for perseverance that enables one to achieve long-term goals. However, Morton and Paul endorse 
an evidential threshold account of rational long-term commitment that I reject, for reasons discussed in §3.3. See Rioux 
(2020-a) for a response to Morton and Paul. For more on the diachronic rationality of commitment, see Buchak (2017-b) 
and Rioux (2020-b). For more on the practical rationality (and moral permissibility) of faith and hope, see Jeffrey (2017).  
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tells us something interesting about both about the relationship between the attitudes and about 
diachronic rationality. 
 
 
2. Acceptance and what justifies it  
  
2.1 Acceptance 
 
Accepting that p is acting as if p. When one accepts a proposition, one treats it as true in one’s practical 
reasoning, and, upon taking action, acts as if it were true (Cohen 1989; Cohen 1992; Weirich 2004; 
Audi 2008; Locke 2015). According to Jonathan Cohen (1992, p. 4), when one accepts a proposition, 
one ‘includes that proposition… among one’s premises for deciding what to do or think in a particular 
context.’ And William Alston (1996, p. 8) notes, ‘to accept that p is to “take it on board,” to include 
it in one's repertoire of (supposed) facts on which one will rely in one's theoretical and practical 
reasoning and one's behavior.’ 
Acceptance is not, in my view, a fundamental mental state.  In fact, it is an action rather than 
a state—Cohen calls it a ‘policy.’ Acceptance is caused by combinations of other mental states (more 
on this soon). Acceptance is also propositional—because we accept propositions, acceptance has 
propositional content. The focus of this paper is action-oriented commitments, and since I am 
concerned with propositional versions of belief, faith, and hope, acceptance is a good candidate for 
their action-oriented propositional analog. Thus, I will focus on acceptance.  
 
2.2 What justifies acceptance 
What justifies accepting a proposition? Since acceptance is a commitment to act (that is, act as if a 
proposition is true), what justifies acceptance is what justifies action. According to two major theories 
of rational action, rational action is a function of two inputs: an epistemic component and an 
axiological/conative component. The first theory of rational action is decision theory.  According to 
decision theory, how you ought to act is a function of two things: the probability of various 
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propositions, and a utility function that reflects the value of various states of affairs (see Briggs 2014). 
On an orthodox decision theory model, you ought to choose the action that maximizes expected 
value, given your credences (subjective probabilities) and your utility function. The second theory of 
rational action is the belief-desire model. On this model, you ought to act in ways that are appropriate, 
given your beliefs and your desires (see Davidson 1963; Bratman 1987). As with decision theory, on a 
belief-desire theory of rational action, how you ought to act is a function of something epistemic 
(beliefs) and something axiological (desires). A little more on each of these components. 
The epistemic component of rational action is a representation of the world, e.g. the agent’s 
beliefs and/or credences. This component is truth-tracking, responsive to evidence, and evaluable 
from primarily an epistemic point of view. It has a mind-to-world direction of fit. Critical to note for 
our purposes is that acting as if p can be rational even if one has no desire that p be true, if one has 
enough confidence or evidence that p is true. We rationally act on things we don't want to be true all 
the time. For example: I failed the exam, so I better act as if I failed and study for my re-take, even 
though I strongly desire that I didn’t fail.  I missed my flight, so I better try to book another one, even 
though I wish that I hadn’t missed it. Thus, there are many cases where a belief that p or a high 
credence that p justifies acting as if p, apart from any desire for p to be the case.   
The conative/axiological component of rational action is about what is valuable or 
desirable, e.g. the agent’s desires or utility function. It has a world-to-mind direction of fit. This 
component, unlike the epistemic component, does not (necessarily) involve evidence or justification 
for p. One can desire p, even rationally, while believing not-p or having a very low credence in p.  
What matters for this component is not whether p, but how good or bad it would be if p. Further, 
accepting p can be rational even if one’s credence is quite low, if one’s desires or utilities are 
strong/high enough (e.g. something very valuable would be gained if p were true). Consider several 
examples.  
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 First, suppose your brother goes missing.  He has been missing for a long time, and there is a 
lot of evidence he is dead. Because of this evidence, you believe and/or have a very high credence that 
he is dead. Nonetheless, you think there is some chance he might be alive. Because it would be so 
good if he was alive and you found him, you act as if he is alive, by putting up missing posters, spending 
lots of time searching for him, etc. The goodness of finding him again motivates you to do this, despite 
your low credence he is living.  
 Second, suppose you are hiking in an uninhabited area and you get lost. You run out of food 
and water and wander around for a very long time. Finally, you find a path back to civilization, but as 
you follow it, it leads you to a steep and wide crevice—just wide enough that there’s a chance you can 
jump across, but, given your jumping abilities, it is unlikely that you will make it. However, making 
this jump is your only chance of survival. You ought to act as if you will make the jump and at least 
try to do so, even though you have little evidence that you will make it—because of how good it would 
be if you succeeded (even apart from self-justifying considerations).2 
 Finally, suppose you are a parent. It is winter and it has recently snowed quite a bit, and you 
take your children outside to play in the snow. You live next to a lake and your children ask if they 
can go play on the frozen lake. It has been below freezing for a significant amount of time, and you 
know that lakes in your area are often thickly covered in ice and safe to walk on. Thus, you have a low 
credence that the ice will break. However, your children are young and if the ice broke, their lives 
would be in danger. Thus, it is rational to insist your children stay far away from the frozen lake, acting 
as if it will break, even though your credence it will break is very low—because it would be very bad 
if the ice broke while your children were playing on it.   
                                                        
2 This case is adapted from James (1897). Some have noted that, if you believe you can make this jump, it will make it 
more likely you will make the jump, because you will gain self-confidence, energy, and zeal which will help you jump 
further. In this, the belief you will succeed creates evidence for itself (see Jackson 2020). However, here, I am interested 
in what makes the action rational, rather than what makes the belief rational, so I set aside these self-justifying cases.  
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 These cases show that rationally accepting p comes apart from belief or a high credence that 
p, depending on what is at stake in a particular decision context. In this, accepting p can be rational, 
even if it is unlikely that the world is such that p or there is good evidence favoring not-p. In what 
follows, I will assume that rational action (and thus rational acceptance) is a function of merely the 
epistemic and the axiological, as these two models suggest.3 I will argue that, given this, paradigm cases 
of rational belief, faith, and hope that p all entail accepting that p.  
 
3. Three attitudes that make acceptance rational 
 
3.1 Belief 
Belief is the attitude of taking something to be the case or regarding it as true (Schwitzgebel 2019). 
Belief generally requires quite a bit epistemically (e.g. fairly strong evidence). We ought not, and often 
will not, believe p if our evidence strongly favors not-p. In this, belief is a state that is primarily sensitive 
to epistemic factors, like evidence and truth. On the other hand, belief that p has no implications for 
desire that p. As noted above, there are many things we believe (that we failed the test or that we 
missed the flight) that we have no desire at all to be true. Thus, belief has a strong epistemic 
component but no essential conative component.  
Nonetheless, the robust epistemic component of belief makes accepting p rational in paradigm 
cases of belief that p. Usually, when we believe that p is true, we act as if p. I believe coffee will wake 
                                                        
3 Recently, Lara Buchak has argued that rational action is a function of three components, rather than two: the epistemic, 
the axiological, and a risk function that represents an agent’s attitudes about worst-case scenarios. She argues that risk-
weighted expected utility (REU) theory has benefits over traditional expected utility (EU) theory, such as providing a 
solution to the Allais Paradox (see Buchak 2013; Buchak 2017-a). My assumption here is consistent with REU theory 
insofar as the agent’s risk function is convex or linear; in the former, the agent is risk-inclined, REU theory will permit all 
actions permitted by EU theory (and more). In cases where the agent’s risk function is linear, REU theory and EU theory 
are equivalent. However, Buchak’s model conflicts with my assumption in cases where the agent’s risk function is concave 
and the agent is risk-averse; in these cases, REU theory doesn’t permit all actions permitted by EU theory. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will utilize a model of rational action that is a function of two elements, rather than three, but it is worth 
noting that my conclusions are also consistent with the verdicts of Buchak’s REU theory, except in the case where the 
agent’s risk function is convex. Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful clarification on this point.  
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me up, so I drink it when I am tired in the morning. I believe my car is parked north of campus, so I 
walk that way when I leave the office. As Cohen (1989, p. 368) notes, ‘we often accept what we believe 
and believe what we accept.’ 
Furthermore, recently some have suggested that part of the functional role of belief is a 
disposition to treat p as true in one’s reasoning (e.g. Wedgwood 2012; Ross and Schroeder 2014). This 
suggestion is plausible and makes sense of the idea that belief and acceptance often go together.  Yet 
the connection between believing p and treating p as true in one’s reasoning is not seamless. Generally, 
depending on the gains and losses associated with not-p, it might be still rational to act as if not-p (as 
long as one doesn’t have credence 1 in p). In the frozen lake example above, you might believe the ice 
is solid but not accept the ice is solid because of the risk of your children falling in. Or you might 
believe your friend’s spouse is cheating on her but not accept it, and e.g. refrain from telling your 
friend about your belief, because if you are wrong, doing so would do a lot of unnecessary damage to 
their marriage. Thus, believing p entails a disposition to treat p as true in one’s reasoning, but this 
disposition is defeasible (see Ross and Schroeder 2014; Jackson 2019). Thus, although there are 
exceptions, paradigm cases of belief that p entail acceptance that p. 
 
3.2 Faith 
Faith is an attitude that has received ample philosophical attention as of late (for overviews, see Bishop 
2016; Rettler 2018). One of the primary controversies in the faith literature involves the relationship 
between faith and belief: specifically, whether faith that p entails believing that p.4 Ultimately, either 
view on this controversy is consistent with my arguments in this paper. However, I will assume that 
faith that p does not entail belief that p for two reasons. One, if faith does entail belief, this makes my 
                                                        
4 Mugg (2016) and Malcolm and Scott (2016) argue that faith entails belief. Pojman (1986), Audi (1991), Alston (1996), 
Kvanvig (2013, 2016), Howard-Snyder (2013) and McKaughan (2013) argue that that faith does not entail belief.  
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arguments easier and, in some sense, stacks the deck in my favor. This is because we have already 
established that there is a tight connection between belief and acceptance, and if faith is just a kind of 
believing, then there is no need for a separate argument connecting faith and acceptance. Second, as 
will become clearer later in the paper, the model I propose on which belief, faith, and hope can make 
commitments rational over time is more interesting on the supposition that faith is possible without 
belief.   
 Assuming faith doesn’t entail belief, what can we say about the nature of faith and its 
relationship to acceptance? First, faith generally has a weaker epistemic component than belief; as 
Alston (1996, p. 12) notes, ‘faith that has at least a strong suggestion of a weak epistemic position vis-
a-vis the proposition in question.’ That is, faith requires less evidence and/or is consistent with a lower 
credence than belief. One reason to think is that it may sound odd to say one has faith that p when 
one is maximally certain that p, whereas belief is undoubtedly consistent with maximal certainty. 
Faith’s epistemic component is nonetheless a moderate one; it is natural to think that faith that p is 
inconsistent with believing not-p or having an extremely low credence in p (see Howard-Snyder 2013). 
For example, it is hard to make sense of the idea that one could have faith that God exists and believe 
that God does not exist. 
Faith further differs from belief in that it has an essential conative component: faith that p 
requires a desire for p to be true.5  To illustrate, suppose my friend Greta is running a marathon.  I tell 
her I have faith that she will win the marathon. At the same time, I strongly desire that she loses the 
marathon. This seems impossible; I cannot have faith that p if I don’t desire p to be the case. Thus, 
while faith has a weaker epistemic component that belief, it has a stronger conative component than 
belief.  
                                                        
5 This point is defended by Alston (1996, p. 12), Howard-Snyder (2013), Kvanvig (2013), McKaughan (2013), among 
others. 
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Faith’s moderate epistemic component and moderate conative component mean that when 
one has faith, one fulfills the two conditions of rational action explained above. For this reason, those 
with faith that p ought to, and often will, accept p (see Alston 1996).6 If one has faith that p, one 
should treat p as true in one’s decision making and act on p.  In this, having faith in a proposition 
requires having a policy of adopting that proposition, ‘taking it on board’ in one’s reasoning and acting. 
In order to dispel potential counterexamples to the suggestion that one ought to accept 
propositions of faith, it is critical to note that what it means to accept a proposition is not always 
straightforward. For example, suppose someone has faith that God exists. Nonetheless, they teach at 
a secular school and they refrain from proselytizing their students and coworkers. It may seem as 
though, prima facie, my view would entail that this means they don’t accept that God exists, and thus 
are irrational or do not actually have faith.7 However, this is too quick. They can treat the proposition 
that ‘God exists’ as a premise in their practical reasoning without, e.g., proselytizing everyone around 
them—what premising God’s existence ultimately looks like depends on their other beliefs/credences 
and desires. They might have faith God exists, but also believe that God does not want them to defy 
authority figures. Or they might think God doesn’t want them to force their faith on the uninterested. 
Thus, whether one accepts p is a complicated matter, and what exactly this looks like requires a holistic 
picture of one’s mental states. Nonetheless, I maintain that those with faith that a proposition is true 
ought to accept that proposition.  
                                                        
6 While Alston also closely links faith and acceptance, he goes one step further and argues that acceptance is the primary 
cognitive component of faith, especially religious faith. In this, Alston seems to treat acceptance as its own fundamental 
cognitive attitude (1996, p. 10). This picture of acceptance and faith is misguided. Since acceptance is, as Alston 
acknowledges, essentially just acting as if p, it is odd to treat it as a cognitive attitude or suggest it is the cognitive component 
of faith. Acceptance is a commitment to act on a proposition, which is merely the result of certain combinations of one’s 
epistemic and conative states. In this, acceptance is, at best, a ‘mental state’ only in the sense that it results from certain 
belief-desire combinations. Acceptance is surely not its own sui generis mental state. Thus, I agree with Alston that faith is 
closely tied to acceptance, but I disagree that acceptance is the cognitive attitude that is a key part of faith. Rather, that 
faith entails or leads to acceptance is a more plausible way of capturing the spirit of Alston’s view. (For another criticism 
of Alston, see Vahid 2009.) 
7 Thanks to Jack Warman. 
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A second potential counterexample to this involves a case where you have faith that p but you 
are faced with a ridiculous bet on which, e.g. you get $1 if p and are tortured forever if not-p. Are 
those with faith really required to take this sort of bet? One response to this style of case is to say that 
refusing to take the bet is evidence that you have given up your faith that p (and note that giving up 
your faith that p this might be the rational response in this circumstance). At the same time, there 
seems to be something praiseworthy about certain cases of people who do not give up their faith, even 
in the face of remarkable odds—this may be why in religious traditions, martyrs are admired and 
considered to be role models of unshakable faith. A second response to this is to weaken the link 
between faith and acceptance, and maintain that those with faith that p will accept p in most 
circumstances, but there can be extreme circumstances where agents have faith but nonetheless need 
not accept the propositions of faith. Since the main thesis of this paper is that belief, faith, and hope 
enable us to maintain commitments over time, it is not crucial that all cases of faith involve rational 
acceptance. Even if there are cases where faith and acceptance come apart, I maintain that faith almost 
always involves rational acceptance, and does so more than belief and hope.  
 
3.3 Hope 
I begin by clarifying the notion of hope I have in mind. First, as noted above, I’m interested in hope 
that has propositional content, as opposed to general, content-less hope (see Marcel 1951, p. 26 and 
Godfrey 1987 for more on this distinction). Second, I’m interested in a strand of hope that is closely 
tied to the rationality of action (see e.g. Martin 2013’s incorporation account of hope; Born 2018).8 
Some authors refer to this more action-oriented strand of hope as hopefulness (Martin 2013, p. 69; 
Bloser and Stahl 2017, p. 367), but for the sake of simplicity, I will generally just use the term ‘hope’.  
                                                        
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee.  
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 This second point is significant because of so-called ‘prosaic’ or mundane cases of hope—for 
instance, my hope that the cashier at the grocery store has a nice day, that my distant cousin gets the 
job he wants, or that my picnic doesn’t get rained out.9 While I acknowledge these are cases of genuine 
hopes, they are generally not hopes that are essential to our long-term commitments or ones that we 
build our lives around. The practical import of prosaic hopes is minimal, especially when compared 
to profound hopes; contrast my hope that the cashier has a nice day with the religious person’s hope 
for the afterlife or the political activist’s hope for world peace (see Chae forthcoming). The latter cases 
involve stronger desires and have more significant practical impact. Here, I concern myself primarily 
with these more profound, life-shaping hopes. 
Hope’s epistemic component is significantly weaker than both faith and belief. Hope that p is 
consistent with a very low credence in p—arguably, with most credences in p except 0.10 In this, all 
hope that p requires, epistemically, is an acknowledgment that there is some chance that p. Thus, those 
with hope that p have not ruled out the possibility of p, but they may nonetheless think p is very 
unlikely (see Martin 2013, p. 11; Meirav 2009, pp. 217–219).  
 On the other hand, desire is a distinctive feature of hope. As Born (2018, p. 107) notes, ‘Hope 
is essentially a desire, a pro-attitude…’ Almost everyone in the hope literature maintains that a desire 
for the proposition in question is a necessary condition for hope.11 Further supporting the claim that 
desire is constitutive of hope is the following sentences:  
#I hope that you have a nice day, but I don’t desire that you have a nice day. 
#I hope that God exists, but I don’t want God to exist.  
                                                        
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee. For further discussion of prosaic hopes, see Martin (2013, pp. 70ff) and Bloser and 
Stahl (2017, pp. 368–9). 
10 Hope may be inconsistent with credence 1 or other very high credences. In most (non-skeptical) contexts, it seems odd 
to say, ‘I hope that 1+1=2,’ or ‘I hope that I exist,’ or generally, ‘I know that p and I hope that p’ (for more on the 
relationship between hope and knowledge, see Benton 2019; Benton forthcoming). As Martin (2013, p. 69) notes, hope 
that p may be consistent with any credence in p between, but excluding, 1 and 0.  
11 See Downie (1963, p. 248); Day (1969, p. 89); Born (2018). A belief that p is possible and a desire for p are widely taken 
to be necessary conditions for hope. However, they may not be jointly sufficient for hope. Among other things, if they are 
sufficient, it is unclear what distinguishes hope from despair (see Meirav 2009); but see Milona (2019) for a defense of the 
belief plus desire view of hope.  
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#I want my team to win the championship, but I hope they don’t win the championship.  
#I desire for it to snow tomorrow, but I hope it doesn’t snow tomorrow.  
 
All of these sentences sound odd, and a good explanation for this is that desire is central to hope. In 
both mundane and non-mundane cases, one of the predominant components of hope is desire. In 
prosaic cases of hope, this desire exists, but may be mild. However, when it comes to profound hopes 
involving propositions linked to our personal, long-term life commitments (my primary focus), the 
desires underlying our hopes are often very strong. 
It is plausible that, especially in profound cases, hope’s conative component is even stronger 
than that of faith. In other words, generally, we have a stronger desire for p when we hope that p than 
when we have faith that p. There are at least two reasons to think this. First, if hope merely involves 
desiring something to the same degree as faith but with less evidence or a lower credence, hope seems 
to look like faith’s ‘younger sibling.’12 Hope would merely be a fallback for those who used to have 
faith but lost confidence or evidence. On this view, hope seems to lose its power and distinctiveness. 
And we have good reason to think that hope is more than a mere fallback, but rather has its own 
unique motivating force. Hope is considered a virtue in many traditions—both secular and religious—
and not merely for those who lose faith, but a virtue in its own right (Mittleman 2009, ch. 2; Amiri 
and Keys 2012, Milona forthcoming). Hope is one of the three Christian theological virtues, alongside 
faith and love. Note that hope is listed next to faith, with no indication that it is subsumed by faith or 
a backup for those who have lost faith (see 1 Cor. 13:13; Augustine c. 420, II.7; Aquinas 1265-
1274/1912, 2.2.17). Other traditions, including Judaism, treat hope in a similar way (see Albo 1930). 
Maintaining that hope’s conative component is stronger than faith’s is one way to avoid this bleak 
                                                        
12 Thanks to Sam Newlands. 
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picture of hope, and capture the widely-supported idea that hope is a virtue and has value that goes 
beyond the value of faith.13  
Further, note that this doesn’t mean that hope cannot be, in some cases, an alternative for 
those who used to have faith—it makes sense to say: ‘I still desire that God exists, and though I have 
lost faith that God exists, I still have some hope.’14 In fact, one of the main claims in this paper is that 
moving from faith to hope is part of what enables us to maintain our long-term commitments in the 
face of a loss of evidence. However, the agents who move from faith to hope must initially have a 
strong enough desire for p to count as hoping; without this, agents who lose faith ought to give up 
their commitment. Thus, while hope should be considered a fallback for faith in this sense, it is also 
not merely needed for a small subset of people who fail to have faith—hope has its own power, 
distinct from faith. 
The second, related reason to think that hope’s conative component is even stronger than that 
of faith is related to a puzzle discussed by some in the hope literature. This puzzle involves explaining 
how hope can have distinct motivating force in arduous circumstances, especially when the probability 
of the hoped-for proposition is quite low (see Pettit 2004, p. 154; McGeer 2004, p. 104; Martin 2013; 
Calhoun 2018). If hope requires an especially strong desire for the proposition in question, this can at 
least partially explain the motivating power of hope, especially in exceptionally difficult situations. And 
if the desires of the hopeful are often stronger than those associated with faith, this can explain why, 
                                                        
13 Although here, note that some authors—e.g. Bovens (1999), Walker (2006), Martin (2013), Calhoun (2018), Stockdale 
(2019)—have challenged the idea that hope is a virtue and crucial for all humans to cultivate. For one, hope can be risky, 
and can lead to wishful thinking and practical irrationality. Two, some cannot cultivate hope due to cognitive impairments. 
On the first point, note that hope’s being a virtue is consistent with the claim that is it sometimes irrational. Consider a 
similar case: courage is a virtue, but one could be irrationally courageous by putting oneself in unnecessarily risky situations 
for little payoff. A virtue theorist might explain these cases by emphasizing the importance of cultivating the virtues 
together—if one has too much hope or courage but no wisdom or prudence, then they might take unnecessary risks. Thus, 
insofar the fully virtuous person is hopeful, her other virtues, like wisdom, might prevent her from engaging in wishful 
thinking. Second, it is true that some cannot cultivate hope due to cognitive impairments; the same is true for other virtues 
as well. A virtue theorist might modify their account to say that one should cultivate virtues insofar as one is able. Thanks to 
an anonymous referee for this objection.  
14 Thanks to an anonymous referee. 
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in some cases, hope seems to motivate as equally well as faith, despite faith’s having a stronger 
epistemic component. Of course, hope’s robust conative component might not be the full story about 
how hope motivates through difficulties; our theory of hope may need to be supplemented with 
another feature of hope, such as Calhoun’s theory about the way hope provides a ‘phenomenological 
idea of the future’ (2018) or Chignell’s focus theory of hope (2021).15 Here, I merely intend to provide 
necessary conditions for hope. Nonetheless, associating hope with especially strong desires can at least 
somewhat explain the way hope uniquely inspires.  
Often, those with hope that p ought to accept p. While hope is consistent with a wide range 
of credences, even quite low ones, hope’s conative component comes in where hope’s epistemic 
component falls short, and this often justifies the hopeful in acceptance. This is because there will be 
a very good outcome if the hopeful person acts as if p and p turns out to be true, and this good 
outcome can outweigh potential losses associated with acting as if p (e.g. if not-p turns out to be true), 
and the gains of taking other courses of action. Consider several examples. I may have a student who 
has failed to turn in all his previous assignments on time. Thus, my credence he will turn in the next 
paper on time is quite low. Nevertheless, I also have a strong desire for him to succeed in the course 
and turn in his work when it is due. Thus, I still assign him to a peer review group, even though 
participation in the group requires one’s paper to be finished promptly. My evidence of his past 
behavior may result in my having such a low credence that I cannot even have faith he will turn the 
paper in on time, but I nonetheless hope he will, and my hope justifies my acting as if he will—because 
of how good it would be if I assigned him to a group and he did turn this paper in on time. Born 
(2018, p. 113) provides another case: suppose you don’t know your neighbor very well and don’t have 
evidence that she is a nice person; you may even have some positive evidence that she is not a nice 
                                                        
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee. But see Milona (2019) for an argument that these extra features of hope are 
unnecessary. 
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person. Nonetheless, you hope that she’s a nice person, and in virtue of this, act as if she’s a nice 
person, and e.g. invite her over for a barbeque or let her borrow eggs. These actions can be potentially 
rational, especially if your counterevidence is not decisive.  
There are more serious examples as well. For instance, Martin (2013, pp. 108–111), 
Duckworth (2016), and Morton and Paul (2019, pp. 198–199) discuss ‘trials’: cases of desperate 
hardship, in which one experiences captivity or alienation and doesn’t have good alternatives available. 
Trials include facing severe obstacles to one’s central life projects, such as enduring a serious disease, 
surviving in a concentration camp, and the missing sibling case discussed above. In these cases, one 
might have very good evidence that one will never overcome the trial, but nonetheless rationally 
continue to act as if one will—because of how good it would be if one persevered and overcame the 
hardship, and the fact that one doesn’t have good alternative courses of action available. Acting as if 
one will find one’s missing brother or as if one will survive a life-threatening illness seem like rational 
responses to finding oneself in a desperate circumstance, and it is natural to see the agents in question 
as acting on the basis of hope that they can overcome the hardship. In most cases of trials, hope 
rationalizes acceptance.  
Nonetheless, unlike faith, hope does not always rationalize acceptance. As Alston (1996, p. 24) 
notes, ‘…acceptance is quite different from hope. I can hope that God will grant me what it takes to 
carry out tasks He gives me without accepting the proposition that He will.’ Or, consider a second 
version of the frozen lake case above, in which I am considering whether to walk across a frozen lake. 
Suppose I hope that the lake is solid—because walking across the lake makes my walk much shorter, 
and if it is solid, I won’t fall in. This mere hope does not rationalize my walking across the lake; walking 
across the lake seems irrational, especially if the probability that it is solid is low and I’m only doing 
so to shorten my walk. Here, I hope that p, but it is irrational to act as if p.16 
                                                        
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this case.  
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One might worry, then, that even if there are cases where hope rationalizes acceptance, there 
are similar cases where hope doesn’t rationalize acceptance, and my view that paradigm cases of hope 
rationalize acceptance begins to look ad hoc.17 Or, put differently: does anything demarcate the cases 
where hope rationalizes accepted from those where hope doesn’t rationalize acceptance? 
In response, a significant part of the difference involves the possibility of not-p. More 
specifically, in cases where an agent has quite a bit to lose if not-p and the probability of not-p is high, 
acting as if p may be irrational, even if one hopes that p. This is why, in the second version of the 
frozen ice case, it is not rational to act as if the ice is solid, even if one genuinely hopes that it is. If the 
ice is not solid and one falls in, this consequence is especially bad—much worse than the value gained 
in shortening one’s walk. But consider a third frozen ice case: one’s child is trapped, and walking 
across the ice is the only way to save the child. Suppose again that it’s possible but unlikely the ice is 
solid. There is even more to be gained or lost, depending on whether the ice holds, but in this third 
case, one’s desire that the ice holds is even stronger. Then, one’s hope that the ice is solid might justify 
accepting that the ice will hold, in order to try to save one’s child. In this third case, acceptance is 
rational, partially due to the fact that the gains associated with p are higher than the losses associated 
with not-p.   
Along similar lines, in the cases of trials discussed above, part of the reason hoping for p 
justifies acting as if p is that there is not much to be lost if not-p—the situation is already dire. 
Generally, the more to be gained if p, and the less to be lost if not-p, and the higher the probability of 
p, the more likely it is that one can rationally act on one’s hope that p. And in the cases of profound 
hopes we’ve focused on, these conditions will often be met—one has a very strong desire that p be 
the case and one has centered one’s life projects around p. Consider again the political activist who 
hopes that we can someday achieve world peace or the religious person who hopes that there is an 
                                                        
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee. 
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afterlife. In these cases, there is much to be gained upon accepting p if p, and this outweighs the losses 
associated with accepting p if not-p. 
This point is further reinforced by the fact that, arguably, cases where one hopes for something 
merely for some small benefit, e.g. hoping that the ice is solid to shorten one’s walk, are mundane 
cases of hope. Mundane hopes will often not rationalize acceptance, which is part of the reason I set 
them aside at the beginning of this section. Thus, especially when we narrow our focus to profound 
hopes, hope often rationalizes acceptance. 
 
4. Upshots 
 
4.1 The diachronic rationality of commitment  
The central upshot of my view is that it can explain the diachronic rationality of commitments to act, 
both in the face of waning affections and in the face of counterevidence. Let us consider each in turn.  
 First, agents can be justified in acting as if p even if they increasingly lose the desire for p to 
be true, as long as they retain sufficient evidence for p. There are many commitments we initially make 
that begin with strong desire or affect that motivates the initial commitment: e.g. the determination of 
those beginning a new workout routine for the first time, the enthusiasm many have when they begin 
graduate school, or the overwhelming affection of the newly married. One may start by believing, 
having faith, and hoping that the propositions relevant to one’s commitment obtain.18 However, the 
affections associated with the latter two states may fade over time, and the desires that motivated the 
                                                        
18 Here, an anonymous referee raises an interesting question: can you believe that p and hope that p at the same time? 
Prima facie, one might think not, given arguments that hope is incompatible with knowledge (Benton 2019; Benton 
forthcoming), and with certainty (Martin 2013, p. 69; see also footnote 10 of this paper). However, belief is weaker than 
both knowledge and certainty. Since believing p is widely taken to be consistent with credences in p below one (because, 
e.g. we are more confident in some of our beliefs than others, and many everyday beliefs are not ones in which we are 
maximally certain), it is natural to think that believing p is consistent with acknowledging that there is a chance that not-p 
(see Jackson 2019). This opens up the possibility that one could believe p, have a strong desire for p, and acknowledge 
there’s a chance that not-p, and on this basis, hope that p. See Born (2018, p. 109) for further discussion on the relationship 
between hope and belief.  
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initial commitment may grow weaker and weaker. Nonetheless, one’s beliefs can enable one to follow 
through and stick to the workouts, graduate school, or marriage, even absent the initial desires and 
affections. In the religious case, agents may lose the desire for God to exist, but nonetheless carry out 
their theistic commitment because they continue to believe that God exists. They may no longer say 
that they hope that God exists, and they may not even have faith that God exists, but their belief that 
God exists enables them to endure and makes their acceptance of God’s existence rational. In the face 
of discouragement, it is sometimes advised that one ought to rely on what they know or believe to be 
true, rather than one’s fluctuating desires or feelings. This may capture something analogous to what 
I have in mind when I suggest that the epistemic component of commitment can enable agents to 
rationally carry out long-term projects in the face of waning affections.  
 This first point is essentially established by the cases in which belief rationalizes acceptance 
apart from desire, such as the failed exam case in §2.2. In this, it is primarily a point about the nature 
of belief.19 However, if my argument that hope has a stronger conative component than faith is 
successful, this opens up a second possibility: cases where one hopes that p, then loses some desire 
that p, but still has enough evidence for p and desire for p that one has faith that p, and thus continues 
to rationally act as if p. In this, in the face of the loss of desire, one can move from hope to faith 
without being forced to give up a commitment. Thus, this point need not be one only about belief, 
although the cases of belief rationalizing acceptance may be the most typical. 
Second, agents can be justified in accepting p even if they get significant counterevidence that 
drastically lowers the probability of p, as long as it doesn’t lower the probability of p to 0. They do so 
by relying on their belief that p, then their faith that p, and then their hope that p. For example, 
suppose someone is a committed religious believer and both believes and accepts that God exists. 
Then, they gain counterevidence, e.g. they experience serious evil in the world and see that this counts 
                                                        
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee. 
 19 
against the existence of an all-powerful, all-good God. Their credence that God exists might decrease 
and this evidence might even require that they give up their belief that God exists, but they can 
nonetheless have faith that God exists and continue to accept that God exists. Suppose they gain even 
more counterevidence, such that their credence is, say, 0.2. Nonetheless, they still maintain that there 
is a chance that God exists and that God’s existing would be a very good thing. Even though they 
think that God probably does not exist, they also believe that if they were wrong and God did exist, 
knowing God would be a very valuable thing. Thus, they continue to accept that God exists and act 
as if God exists, by going to church, praying, participating in a religious community, and the like (see 
e.g. Benatar 2006; Kleinschmidt 2017; Palmqvist 2019). This can be rational for them, despite the fact 
their credence is quite low, due to the fact that they think God’s existing would be valuable and there 
would be a huge benefit to doing those things if God turns out to exist.  
Further, Benton (2018, pp. 431-433) argues that interpersonal knowledge of God is possible 
even apart from belief that God exists, given a more general principle that interpersonal knowledge 
of S floats free from propositions known or believed about S (see also Benton 2017, p. 827). Thus, 
there may be some noteworthy sense in which the hopeful or faithful person described above can 
count as knowing God, even if they neither know nor believe that God exists.20  
If, as argued above, both faith and hope can ground rational acceptance, then agnosticism and 
even atheism are rationally consistent with accepting that God exists (and having interpersonal 
knowledge of God), as long as one’s credence that God exists is not 0. As Born (2018, p. 111) notes 
‘[you can] fail to believe that there is a God, but still hope that there is a God…and in virtue of that 
still centre (central parts of) your life on the proposition that there is a God.’ My model of belief, faith, 
and hope thus shows how a religious commitment can be rational over time, in the face of evidence 
that significantly lowers one’s credence in theism (or other religious propositions).   
                                                        
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee.  
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Similar considerations apply to other kinds of commitments as well: one might get 
counterevidence that indicates that one shouldn’t be in graduate school or that one’s decision to marry 
someone wasn’t a good one, but because of how good things would be if the evidence was ultimately 
misleading and the commitment worked out, one can continue to act on the propositions that initially 
motivated the commitment. In all these cases, as counterevidence builds, these agents begin with 
belief, then move to faith, then move to hope. Yet since all these attitudes can rationalize acceptance, 
this sustains one’s commitments over time, even in light of weighty counterevidence.21 
Thus, my account suggests that the relationship between belief, faith, hope, and acceptance 
can rationalize long-term commitments in the face of a serious loss of evidence or a serious loss of 
desire. Table 1 summarizes the model I am proposing: 
 
Table 1: Belief, Faith, Hope, and Acceptance 
Before moving on, a quick note about the scope of my claims in this paper. My main thesis is 
that belief, faith, and hope enable certain commitments to be rational over time. Nevertheless, I do 
not intend to argue that belief, faith, and hope enable all commitments to be rational over time, or 
that every instance of these attitudes rationalizes acceptance. As came out in the previous section, 
there are cases where belief and hope (and maybe faith) are genuinely present, but nonetheless one 
ought not accept p. That’s perfectly consistent with my goal, namely, to trace a path that agents can 
                                                        
21 Another model for how long-term commitments can be rational in the face of counterevidence is given by Buchak 
(2017-b). There are two salient differences. First, she focuses on the role of faith in long-term commitments, while my 
focus additionally includes belief and hope. Second, she discusses cases where there is a diachronic-synchronic conflict, 
and argues that sometimes agents should privilege the diachronic value of maintaining a long-term commitment over what 
it is rational for them to do at a time. My account is neutral on this point, and is consistent with the idea that the agents in 
question can maintain their diachronic commitments without sacrificing synchronic rationality. 
 Epistemic requirement Conative requirement Involves rationally 
accepting p? 
Belief that p High None Most cases 
Faith that p Medium Medium All cases 
Hope that p Low High Many cases 
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take, such that commitment is rational in the face of loss of evidence or desire. And if paradigm 
instances of each attitude rationalize acceptance, then in both a fair number of cases and in standard 
cases, the commitment will be rational, even if the commitment isn’t rational in all cases. 
Thus, focusing on paradigm cases is all that is needed to establish this paper’s thesis. In 
response to the worry that focusing on paradigm cases is ad hoc, I’ve provided some general principles 
that demarcate rational and irrational acceptance. I reiterate the principle discussed above: the more 
to be gained if p, and the less to be lost if not-p, and the higher the probability of p, the more likely it 
is that one can rationally act on one’s hope that p. Many cases where acceptance is not permitted are 
marked by agents having quite a bit to lose if not-p, such as the agent who believes or hopes the ice is 
solid, but isn’t justified in accepting p because of the risk of falling in. Relatedly, it is critical to note 
that sometimes, it is rational to give up a commitment. This can happen for a variety of reasons. The 
obvious case is one in which one loses both the desire and the evidence associated with the 
commitment. But cases where not-p is associated with a serious loss may also mark places where it is 
rational to relinquish a commitment, depending on one’s other beliefs/credences and desires. 
 
4.2 The unique power of faith  
A second notable upshot of my account is that, in a key sense, faith, rather than hope or belief, is the 
most powerful and stable attitude. This is because faith always (or almost always) entails rationally 
accepting the proposition(s) of faith, whereas belief and hope more often come apart from rational 
acceptance. While I maintain that paradigm cases of each state rationalize acceptance, faith is most 
closely tied to acceptance. In this, faith plays a special role in maintaining one’s long-term projects. 
This captures a natural thought: that faith is uniquely a crucial part of commitment. This isn’t to say 
that belief and hope aren’t important: they play a role when one doesn’t have the desires needed for 
faith or doesn't have the evidence needed for faith, respectively. However, my account gives a 
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privileged position to faith, and, insofar as this is pretheoretically plausible, this provides an additional 
consideration in favor of my view. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I’ve argued that belief, faith, and hope all play the same role in rationalizing long-term commitments 
to act over time. I’ve shown that on two classic models of practical rationality, rational action is a 
function of the epistemic and the conative. Given this, belief, faith, and hope can all play the same 
role in making acceptance rational. In this, our long-term projects can overcome two major obstacles: 
the loss of evidence and the loss of desire.22 
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